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Abstract
Many peer‐to‐peer sharing platforms are transforming their business model from
sharing for free to renting with or without in‐person interactions. How will these
changes affect consumers’ participation in peer‐to‐peer sharing of personal items?
The work studies consumers’ choice among three business models that vary on two
dimensions: “free versus renting” and “with or without in‐person interactions.” The
novelty is to consider that consumers’ choice can be driven by their perceptions
of relationships among peers, which are shaped by the business models of sharing
platforms. Perceptions of communal sharing (CS) relationships among peers are found
to differ across business models and to predict consumers’ choice among the
platforms above and beyond the economic and social benefits that consumers
seek. Interestingly, perceptions of CS are not only found to explain the choice of a
sharing for the free business model over the two others, but also the choice of renting
with in‐person interactions over renting without in‐person interactions. For managers
of peer‐to‐peer sharing platforms, this means that renting does not make sharing
completely similar to traditional market exchanges as long as in‐person interactions
are involved. For scholars, this calls for more work on the factors that bring about
perceptions of CS.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Peer‐to‐peer sharing refers to “consumers granting each other
temporary access to underutilized physical assets” (Frenken & Schor,
2017, pp. 4–5). Peer‐to‐peer sharing is supported by online‐based
platforms (Wilhelms, Henkel, & Falk, 2017) that enable large‐scale
sharing among individuals who are either only weakly related along
other social dimensions or complete strangers (Frenken & Schor,
2017; Schor, 2014). While a few platforms such as Airbnb have been
tremendously successful, most peer‐to‐peer sharing platforms are
still trying to figure out which business model will help them attract
enough consumers to be viable in the long term.
The objective of this paper is to investigate systematically
consumers’ choice among three business models used by peer‐
to‐peer sharing platforms—namely, (a) sharing for free and with
in‐person interactions among consumers; (b) renting with in‐person
interactions; and (c) renting without in‐person interactions. While
sharing for free with in‐person interactions was the business model
initially adopted by many peer‐to‐peer sharing platforms, quite a few
platforms are now experimenting with business models that aim to
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increase the economic benefits as well as the convenience for
consumers. First, some sharing platforms have moved from sharing
for free to a rental scheme (i.e., sharing for a fee) because of a belief
among managers of sharing platforms as well as scholars that sharing
can only compete with traditional market exchanges if it is financially
attractive to providers as well as users (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012;
Eckhardt & Bardhi, 2015).1 While for users accessing durable assets
through peer‐to‐peer sharing platforms is generally less expensive
than traditional market alternatives (i.e., buying and renting from
a company), for providers sharing platforms can only offer an
additional source of income when sharing takes the form of renting
(Habibi, Davidson, & Laroche, 2017; Schor, 2014). Second, some
platforms have gone even further by adopting remote access
technologies such as keyless entry into homes and cars and
partnering with couriers for the pickup and delivery of household
items. These remote access technologies aim to increase convenience
for consumers as they allow transactions to take place without an
in‐person meeting of the provider and user of the personal item.
It is important to investigate whether consumers will choose
platforms with business models that involve renting and no
in‐person interactions because the sharing literature has argued that
consumers are drawn to sharing in search of social as well as economic
benefits and it has identified a tension in delivering both types of
benefits (Belk, 2010, 2014a). This tension follows from the fact that the
business models adopted to deliver economic benefits usually make
peer‐to‐peer sharing more similar to traditional market exchanges and,
therefore, could threaten the delivery of social benefits, such as the
feeling to belong to a community and more social interactions, which
have been found to be a common motivation to engage in peer‐to‐peer
sharing (Belk, 2014a; Habibi et al., 2017; Schor, 2014).
To research what drives consumers’ choice among the three
business models, the paper starts with the social and economic
benefits consumers seek to clarify the limits of what it already known
in the literature. The paper focuses on these two types of benefits
because they relate to the two dimensions along which the three
business models differ from each other, namely (a) sharing for free
versus renting and (b) in‐person interactions versus no in‐person
interaction. The paper then goes on to examine the other side of the
coin—namely, what the business models are perceived to offer—by
building on Fiske’s (1991; 1992) relational models theory. Relational
models theory proposes that people have a set of four mental
representations at their disposal to make sense of their relationships
with others, of which three apply to peer‐to‐peer sharing (namely,
communal sharing [CS], equality matching [EM], and market pricing
[MP]), and the theory suggests that each mental representation
signals the potential for different types of social benefits. On this
basis, the three business models were hypothesized to lead to
different mental representations of relationships among peers,
which, in turn, were expected to help explain consumers’ choice
among the business models.
The hypotheses were tested with a joint evaluation design involving
601 respondents. In this within‐subject design, respondents were asked
to choose which online‐based, peer‐to‐peer sharing platform they would
prefer to participate in (either as provider or user) among three
platforms whose descriptions match the three business models. In line
with the literature, the social and economic benefits consumers seek
were found to explain respondents’ choice among the three business
models. Furthermore, the three business models were found to differ in
terms of the mental representations of peer‐to‐peer relationships:
sharing for free scored highest on CS, renting with in‐person interactions
highest on EM, and renting without in‐person interactions highest on
MP. Differences in CS perceptions helped explain consumers’ choice
between the three models. In contrast, differences in EM and MP
perceptions had little to no explanatory power.
This work advances our knowledge of platform attractiveness in
three ways. First, the study provides a new angle to approach platform
attractiveness, namely consumers’ mental representations of peer‐to‐
peer relationships, that complements the existing findings on attractive-
ness based on the type of benefits that consumers seek. This new angle
can help understand better the nature of the social benefits platforms
can deliver. Second, the study shows that it is not making sharing more
or less market‐like that affects consumers’ choice of platforms but rather
making it more or less community‐like. This is good news for managers
of platforms who must find a way to both attract consumers and make
money in order for their platform to survive. Third, looking at three
business models that differ along two dimensions—free versus renting
and with versus without in‐person interactions—allows to contribute to
the debate about which of the two dimensions matters in delivering
social benefits: both dimensions turn out to matter.
2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Peer‐to‐peer sharing platforms are intermediaries that connect
online providers with users and facilitate peer‐to‐peer sharing
(Hamari, Sjöklint, & Ukkonen, 2016). What distinguishes these
platforms from earlier market places such as eBay is that transac-
tions do not involve a transfer of ownership: people borrow or rent
someone else’s personal items for a short period of time (Frenken &
Schor, 2017). While many forecast an extraordinary future for the
sharing economy, the truth is that, unlike Airbnb or Uber, many peer‐
to‐peer sharing platforms are still in their infancy (Belk, 2014b) and
will only be able to survive if they find a business model with which
they can monetize the services they offer in facilitating peer‐to‐
peer sharing. A business model reflects a “hypothesis about what
customers want, and how an enterprise can best meet those needs,
and get paid for doing so” (Teece, 2007, p. 1329). As they start up
peer‐to‐peer sharing platforms often choose for a sharing for free
model and, therefore, offer their intermediary services for free.
However, sharing platforms can only survive in the longer term if
they successfully switch to a business model with a value proposition
that is not only attractive to participants but also enables the
platform to capture enough value (Teece, 2010).
1Rental schemes have also the advantage for platforms to enable the collection of a
commission on each peer‐to‐peer transaction.
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Some platforms have already transitioned to a new business
model. An example is Peerby, a frontrunner when it comes to finding,
borrowing or renting personal items, from power drills and barbecues
to drones, from nearby neighbors (Morrisey, 2015). Founded in
Amsterdam in 2012, Peerby.com is now active in 20 European cities,
it counts over 500,000 members and $ 1 billion worth of items in its
database. Peerby initially adopted a sharing for free model and
processed the lending‐borrowing transactions among its participants
free of charge, but in 2016 it launched a new business model,
PeerbyGo, that facilitates renting transactions among participants
from which the platform collects a commission. With PeerbyGo, the
company also introduced the option of renting without in‐person
interactions by partnering with couriers for the pickup and delivery
of household items, based on the belief that consumers value less
in‐person interactions than accessing others’ personal items at a time
that is convenient (Eilander, 2015).
Observing these changes in the business model, the objective of
this paper is to study consumers’ choice among the two new business
models involving renting (with and without in‐person interactions)
and the initial sharing for the free business model. It is important to
research the potential impact on these changes in the business model
on the attractiveness of platforms in consumers’ eyes. First, it is
known that e‐businesses have often struggled to keep attracting
customers when switching to a new business model to monetize their
value proposition (Pauwels & Weiss, 2008). Second, removing
in‐person interactions to increase convenience has also shown to
have an unexpected dark side. Turo, a US‐based peer‐to‐peer car‐
sharing platform (formerly known as RelayRides), has experienced
the dangers of removing in‐person interactions first hand. In 2012,
seeking to increase convenience for its members, the sharing
platform removed the need for members to meet in person by
installing a tool that allows people to unlock cars via an app. Whilst
this initiative seemed great on paper, the platform reverted in 2013
to owners and renters meeting face to face to hand over the car key
on the argument that “Both owners and renters have shared their
overwhelmingly positive experiences from meeting in person to
exchange keys. It’s one of the many aspects that makes the
RelayRides experience really special and unique” (RelayRides, 2013).
This study researches consumers’ choice among the three
business models from two angles. First, it applies the existing
arguments in the literature related to the economic and social
benefits consumers seek. Second, it turns to a new, complementary
line of explanation based on relational models theory.
2.1 | Sought benefits and choice among business
models
With their difference in terms of sharing for free versus renting and
in‐person interactions versus no in‐person interaction, the three
business models are likely to be perceived as different in terms of
the economic and social benefits they can deliver to consumers. The
sharing literature has already convincingly argued that the search for
social benefits, in addition to economic benefits, draws consumers to
sharing. Social benefits include the psychological benefits of
reinforcing the emotional bonds with others, of belonging to a
community, and of having the possibility to do something good for
others, while economic benefits relate to material utility and include
cost savings, and additional income for providers (Hellwig, Morhart,
Girardin, & Hauser, 2015; Hennig‐Thurau, Henning & Sattler, 2007).
There is a lot of anecdotal evidence that links sharing to social
benefits. For example, Michael Green, founder of Sharehood, a
platform on which members share their local resources for free,
explained that the ability to make friends and be part of a community
is the strongest motivation for people to sign‐up and participate
(Larkin, 2011). The promise of getting to know other people
also drives participation in Couchsurfing, and even toy libraries
(Belk, 2010; Ozanne & Ballantine, 2010). Whereas early scientific
studies (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012; Lamberton & Rose, 2012) did
not find social benefits to drive participation in sharing, later ones
(Bucher, Fieseler, & Lutz, 2016; Habibi, Kim, & Laroche, 2016; Hamari
et al., 2016) showed that social benefits matter to explain
participation on sharing platforms.
Furthermore, Hellwig et al. (2015) found that consumers can be
clustered according to the type of benefits they seek from sharing:
whilst “sharing pragmatists” instead look for material benefits and
convenience, “sharing idealists” are driven by social benefits “such as
being part of a community or prosocial ideals linked to helping other”
(Hellwig et al., 2015, p. 904). Hellwig et al. (2015), therefore, proposed,
on the one hand, that “sharing pragmatists” should be attracted by
business models emphasizing money and convenience. Translating this
to the three business models studied here implies that consumers
seeking economic benefits would be expected to choose renting
without in‐person interactions. On the other hand, Hellwig et al. (2015,
p. 904) proposed that “sharing idealists” should be “attracted by
business models that emphasize social and emotional benefits in their
value proposition; for example, community‐supported agriculture,
neighborhood support such as www.sharesomesugar.com, or the
popular travel community CouchSurfing”. Among the three business
models studied here, the sharing for the free model is the one
emphasizing most clearly social benefits. Consequently, the existing
arguments in the literature lead to clear predictions regarding the
relationships between the type of benefits consumers seek from
participating in sharing and the choice among two of the three
business models currently implemented by sharing platforms, namely
the sharing for free model—the initial model of many peer‐to‐peer
sharing platforms—and the renting without in‐person interactions
model—described as desirable by managers of sharing platforms
looking to offer more convenience to attract consumers:
H1a The more consumers are driven by social benefits, the more likely
they are to choose sharing for free over renting without in‐person
interactions.
H1b The more consumers are driven by economic benefits, the more
likely they are to choose renting without in‐person interactions
over sharing for free.
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While it seems easy to draw hypotheses for sharing for free
versus renting without in‐person interactions, to our knowledge,
consumers’ perceptions of the benefits delivered by the different
business models have not been researched as such. Furthermore, the
existing literature is much less clear about the attractiveness of
the third business model, which combines renting with in‐person
interactions. A number of authors have questioned whether
monetized sharing transactions would have the desired effect of
attracting more consumers on the ground that money crowds out
social benefits. For example, Belk (2014a) argued that renting is not
“true sharing” and Hellwig et al. (2015) wrote that emphasizing
material utility and convenience could be less appealing or could
even alienate “sharing idealists” (but they did not go as far as
formulating a proposition about this relationship).
In contrast, other authors argued that it is possible to have
attractive “dual‐mode” business models that combine social and
economic benefits in the mind of consumers (Habibi et al., 2017).
Interestingly, recent research suggests that in‐person interactions—
rather than the absence of money—could be the key to reducing
psychological distance and activating an emotional bond between
peers involved in sharing and, therefore, the key to delivering social
benefits such as the feeling to belong to a community. In particular,
Pera, Viglia, Grazzini, and Dalli (2019) showed that, compared to
larger‐scale, more impersonal renting (Booking.com), more human
connections between guests and hosts in peer‐to‐peer accommoda-
tion sharing (Airbnb) as well as in smaller‐scale hotels (Booking.com)
activate empathy in guests confronted with a poor experience, who
are then less willing to provide a negative review. The importance of
in‐person interactions to foster a feeling to belong to a community is
illustrated by Rosen, Lafontaine, and Hendrickson (2011) who found
that Couchsurfing’s members who have not met face‐to‐face with
other members have a lower sense of belonging to the community
than those who have. In relation to distributed work—which, like
peer‐to‐peer sharing, involves a high degree of technology‐mediated
communication—in‐person interactions have been found to help
establish an emotional bond (a) thanks to the engagement of the
human body in the social interaction (not only physical appearance,
body language, facial expressions, but also touching such as a
handshake, sharing a drink, or “showing up” in person) and (b) thanks
to informal conversation (jokes, gossip, how‐are‐the‐kids questions;
Nardi & Whittaker, 2002). If in‐person interactions are indeed the
key to delivering social benefits, this could imply that, with respect to
the social benefits, sharing for free is more similar to renting with in‐
person interactions than renting with in‐person interactions is to
renting without in‐person interactions.
To sum up, the literature has offered an explanation of platform
attractiveness in terms of fit between the nature of the benefits—
social or economic—that consumers seek from participating in the
sharing economy and the benefits that platforms deliver, but which
benefits platforms with different business models can deliver, in
consumers’ eyes, have not been empirically investigated. Further-
more, there is the reason to question whether delivering social
benefits is primarily hampered by the introduction of money in peer‐
to‐peer relationships or by the removal of in‐person interactions.
Therefore, to shed new light on consumers’ preferences, the present
work builds on Fiske’s (1991; 1992) relational models theory. This
theory offers a more complex understanding of human sociality than
a simple social versus economic dichotomy: it suggests putting the
spotlight on perceptions of peer‐to‐peer relationships to grasp the
benefits that consumers anticipate to get from sharing on a platform
with a specific business model.
After an introduction to relational models theory, the arguments
proceed in two steps. First, the three business models are argued
to lead to three different views of relationships among peers.
Second, these different perceptions of peer‐to‐peer relationships are
expected to help explain consumers’ choice among the peer‐to‐peer
sharing platforms. Figure 1 depicts all the hypotheses.
2.2 | Business models and mental representations
of Peer‐to‐Peer relationships
Whilst most research into the sharing economy opposes social and
economic benefits, relational models theory suggests that humans
use, not two but, four mental representations of relationships to
make sense of all social relationships (Fiske, 1991, 1992, 2004; Fiske
& Haslam, 2005; Rai & Fiske, 2011). Specifically, relational models
theory posits that people (unconsciously) use four relational models
“to plan and to generate their own action, to understand, remember
and anticipate others’ action, to coordinate the production of
collective action and institutions and to evaluate their own and
others’ actions” (Fiske, 2004, p. 3). Each of these relational models
conveys distinct expectations regarding who people are with respect
Type of benefits consumers seek:
• Social
• Economic
Mental representations of peer-to-
peer relationships for the three 
business models (H2a-c):
• CS differential
• EM differential
• MP differential
Choice of a business model among:
• Sharing for free
• Renting with in-person 
interactions
• Renting without in-person 
interactions
H1a&b
H3a-c
F IGURE 1 Hypothesized relationships
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to each other (“who am I?”), which in turn evoke distinct needs,
motivations, and rules of behavior (“what is appropriate behavior for
myself and my relational partner in this interaction?”; Bridoux &
Stoelhorst, 2016). Interacting individuals in a given context tend to
converge on a single relational model to guide their interaction
(Fiske, 1992).
Out of the four models, three are relevant for peer‐to‐peer
sharing relationships: CS, EM, and MP.2 CS is the relational model
that usually governs relationships among family members and close
friends (Fiske, 1991). This model calls forward norms of care and
responding to others’ needs: no one keeps a tally on how much is
given and received (Fiske, 1991). When CS is primed, individuals feel
a sense of collective responsibility toward in‐group members and are
intrinsically motivated to contribute to the collective good to the
best of their ability, irrespective of what they get out of the
relationship (Fiske 1991; Lickel, Rutchick, Hamilton, & Sherman,
2006). In other words, altruism is the normatively appropriate
behavior. This implies that bookkeeping regarding what is given and
received undermines the relationship and self‐interested behavior is
totally taboo (Fiske, 1992; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997).
EM revolves around balancing what is given and received and,
therefore, relationships governed by EM function according to norms
of equality, balanced reciprocity, and tit‐for‐tat (Fiske, 1991, 1992).
EM usually regulates relationships among people who see each other
as peers such as neighbors, colleagues at the same hierarchical level,
and more distant friends (Fiske, 1991). In relationships governed by
EM, individuals are driven by a sense of obligation to reciprocate
in‐kind acts, much as we feel that we have to invite people around to
our house after we have been invited to theirs (Rai & Fiske, 2011;
Sheppard & Sherman, 1998). Given the centrality of reciprocity,
when EM is primed, self‐interested behavior is inappropriate and
generates negative emotions that regularly lead to an eye‐for‐an‐eye
form of revenge (Fiske, 1991; Rai & Fiske, 2011).
In the MP relational model, individuals are expected to be driven
by a cost‐benefit analysis whereby they contribute (money, effort,
etc.) in direct proportion to the benefits they get out of the
relationship (Fiske, 1991). Individuals’ motivations to participate are
a search for efficiency, the fulfillment of material needs, and equity.
In relationships governed by MP, self‐interest is, therefore, accep-
table as long as it does not turn into cheating and opportunism
(Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016). Contracts, prices, and systems to
sanction opportunistic behaviors are usual features of relationships
governed by MP (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016).
Business models are expected to matter to explain how
consumers perceive relationships on sharing platforms because
consumers usually interact with strangers on these platforms, that
is, individuals with whom they have not interacted in the past and
about whom they have limited if any, information (Schor, 2014).
When interacting with strangers, contextual cues have a significant
impact on people’s perception of the nature of the interactions.
Among others, this has been abundantly illustrated in social dilemma
experiments where, when interactions are anonymous, changes in
the rules and parameters of the game often affect substantially the
levels of cooperative behavior (Haley & Fessler, 2005).
The three business models studied here are expected to lead to
different perceptions of relationships among peers because each
business model cues one relational model (CS, EM, or MP) more than
the two other relational models, while the two other business models
cue more another relational model. At the one end of the spectrum, a
sharing for free business model is likely to more strongly cue CS than
EM or MP. Given that providers make their personal items available
for free and no tally is kept of what is given and received, sharing for
free involves transactions that are for a large part driven by a social
motivation. According to the sharing literature, the primary motiva-
tion for participation in sharing when for free is the opportunity to
meet new people and learn about different cultures (Habibi et al.,
2016). Belk (2014a, p. 16) classifies this form of sharing as “sharing
in” because actors incorporate those with whom they share as
“aggregate extended self,” which is very close to the community
identity that is central to CS. Furthermore, and in line with what is
seen as inappropriate in a CS model, scholars have advised managers
of platforms that have adopted this business model to avoid
references to calculations as it could displace the communal aspect
of sharing (e.g., Habibi et al., 2017).
At the other end of the spectrum, renting without in‐person
interactions is likely to more strongly cue MP than CS or EM. With
this business model, sharing platforms offer a private experience
of sharing, driven by pricing schemes (Bhardi & Eckhardt, 2012;
Habibi et al., 2016). Peers can access others’ personal items without
coming into contact with the owner; removing, therefore, in‐person
interactions with other consumers. This is facilitated by remote
access technologies, which enable access to cars and homes without
the need to pick up the key, and by partnerships with service
providers in mail and logistics, parcel pick up points and so forth.
Whilst this increases convenience, it comes with increased anonymity
and a focus on the individual material benefits from sharing:
“customers calculate what they receive and their goal is to gain
more utility in satisfying their needs (…) they would switch over to
another competitor who offers better value for the money and other
cost‐saving benefits” (Habibi et al., 2017, p. 119; Van Glind, 2015).
Customer reviews on Drivy Open, a French car‐sharing platform that
operates using remote access technology, illustrate this point. Users
comment, for example, that they found it “very cost‐effective”; to
provide an excellent service “to anyone looking to hire a car at an
affordable price”. Owners willing to share their car are recruited with
the slogan “let your car work for you” (drivy.com). There is no
mention of social benefits, either on the side of the users or the
owners renting out their car. As one would expect if relationships are
governed primarily by MP, complaints center around deposits and
insurance. In short, this monetized business model is set up to appeal
primarily to people’s material interests and transforms sharing into
2The fourth model is called Authority Ranking. It refers to “a relationship of asymmetric
differences, commonly exhibited in a hierarchical ordering of statuses and precedence, often
accompanied by the exercise of command and complementary displays of deference and
respect” (Fiske, 1991, p. ix). Given the nonhierarchical nature of relationships on peer‐to‐
peer sharing platforms, Authority Ranking is not applicable to our context.
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an impersonal exchange very similar to traditional market exchanges,
with only one distinguishing feature: the asset that is shared belongs
to a peer rather than to a company (The Economist, 2013).
A hybrid business model that combines renting with in‐person
interactions is likely to cue EM more strongly than MP or CS. On the
one hand, scholars have found that consumers generally perceive
renting with in‐person interactions to be different from traditional
market exchanges (Bucher et al., 2016; Habibi et al., 2017, 2016).
Participants of sharing platforms with such a business model report
to be driven by social benefits such as social connections as well as
monetary benefits (Bucher et al., 2016). For example, while there is
no denying that monetary incentives play a role, Airbnb put forward
“connections” rather than “finance” as the true reward (Airbnb, n.d)
and the exchange does not boil down to simply providing money for a
bed. On the other hand, it is not so much a sense of community like in
CS‐based relationships but rather reciprocity that grounds transac-
tions: hosts who go out of their way to make their guests feel at
home expect good reviews and guest are expected to be dependable
and treat their host’s home like it is a friend’s house. The arguments
above lead to the following hypotheses:
H2a A sharing for free model scores higher on CS than the other two
business models.
H2b A renting without in‐person interactions model scores higher on
MP than the other two business models.
H2c A renting with in‐person interactions model scores higher on EM
than the other two business models.
2.3 | Mental representations of Peer‐to‐Peer
relationships and choice
The second step is to consider perceptions of peer‐to‐peer relation-
ships as drivers of consumers’ choice among the three business
models. Platforms scoring higher on CS and EM are expected to be
preferred over platforms scoring lower on these relational models,
whereas platforms scoring higher on MP are expected to be chosen
by fewer consumers than platforms scoring lower on MP. These
expectations are based on the social benefits that consumers can
anticipate to get on a platform given their perceptions of peer‐to‐
peer relationships as scoring more or less high on CS, EM, and MP.
People regularly seek and maintain CS and EM relationships for
the sake of the relationships themselves because these types of
relationships fulfill human needs for sociality (Fiske, 1991). By
comparison, the social benefits individuals get from engaging in
relationships perceived as MP is lower because this type of
relationships is often merely a means to facilitate the exchange
of goods or services, with the exchange as the objective of
the relationship rather than the relationship itself (Bridoux &
Stoelhorst, 2016).
CS and EM deliver social benefits by contributing to building an
identity that transcends the self (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016). In
relationships perceived as CS, relational partners are seen as
community members who are very similar (i.e., they share the same
important characteristics such as values and norms), which fulfills
individuals’ need for affiliation with social groups (Brickson, 2007;
Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016). In relationships perceived as EM,
individuals’ identity stretches to include the relational partners’ well‐
being, at least as long as the partners are perceived to be cooperative
(Brickson, 2007; Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016). The tit‐for‐tat
reciprocity at the core of EM fulfills people’s need for equality
(Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016), a widely shared social preference
(Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer, & O’Doherty, 2010). EM relationships as
the “common blueprint for connecting people (…) in every society
people give matching gifts back and forth (…) what people get out of
such even exchanges is not some kind of long term gain or material
security, but the EM relationship itself” (Fiske, 1992, p. 703–704). In
contrast to identities that transcend the self in CS and EM, the level
of identification in MP is personal: the individual sees him/herself as
different and, therefore, more detached from others (Brickson, 2007;
Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016). In turn, more psychological distance has
been found to lead to lower empathy in users confronting with a poor
experience on sharing platforms (Pera et al., 2019).
Moreover, both CS and EM signal respect and care for the
relational partners and their property: in CS, the norm is altruism
toward other community members, whereas in EM the norm is
balanced reciprocity. These moral norms and the empathy they
generate in participants should help reduce the perceived
vulnerability from sharing with strangers in an online context. In
contrast, MP signals self‐interest, which increases perceived vulner-
ability and may lead consumers to shy away from a platform where
relationships appear to be governed by this relational model to avoid
being taken advantage of. These arguments lead to the following
hypotheses:
H3a The larger the difference in CS scores between two business
models, the more likely consumers are to choose the business
model with the higher score.
H3b The larger the difference in EM scores between two business
models, the more likely consumers are to choose the business
model with the higher score.
H3c The larger the difference in MP scores between two business
models, the less likely consumers are to choose the business model
with the higher score.
3 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
3.1 | Respondents and procedure
The respondents were recruited in the summer of 2016 in the major
cities of the Netherlands (Rotterdam, The Hague, Amsterdam, and
Utrecht). Respondents were approached in public areas such
as at university campuses, parks, the beach, train stations, and
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shopping malls. Respondents were asked to give their email
address, after which they were invited to take part in an online
survey hosted by SurveyMonkey. The survey was in Dutch.3
Respondents were not financially compensated for their participa-
tion, but they could take part in a lottery where they could win
an iPad. Many respondents volunteered to share the link to the
survey with their colleagues and friends and on social media,
resulting in some snowball sampling.
Of the 949 respondents who accessed the survey, 601 provided
fully completed questionnaires. The sample comprised 334 women
and 267 men (57 vs. 44%), 344 respondents held a university degree,
182 a higher vocational education and 73 reported a lower education
level than higher vocational (57 vs. 30 vs. 12%). The average age was
32.5 (standard deviation [SD] = 13.69). Approximately half of the
respondents fell into a lower income bracket (<1,500 euros per
month), 165 respondents (27%) enjoyed a medium‐income (between
1,501 and 1,500 euros per month) and 134 (22%) enjoyed a gross
monthly income of 3,501 euros or more. A little over half of the
respondents lived in the four largest cities in the Netherlands, the
remaining 278 respondents (46%) lived in a less densely populated
area. With these characteristics, this sample is not fully representa-
tive of the Dutch population. Specifically, based on the data from
the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, our sample counts a higher
proportion of women than a representative sample would (50.4% of
women in the Dutch population), is younger (41.5 was the average
age in the Netherlands in 2016), quite more educated (30% of the
Dutch population had a university or higher vocational degree in
2016), and less affluent (the median gross income was €2,585 in
2016; www.cbs.nl).
In line with previous studies of the relational models (Haslam &
Fiske, 1999; Simpson & Laham, 2015), a within‐subject, joint
evaluation design was used. Specifically, respondents were randomly
assigned to the role of provider or user and read hypothetical
descriptions of the three business models, after which they chose one
platform on which to share and were asked to score each platform on
CS, EM, and MP. By comparison to separate evaluation design, a joint
evaluation design provides respondents with a shared context for
comparison (McGraw & Tetlock, 2005). Explicit comparisons allow
for evaluating trade‐offs, which results in more reasoned choices (for
more information Bazerman & Moore, 2013). A joint evaluation
design has been successfully implemented to study the impact of
relational framing on taboo trade‐offs, moral judgment, and group
types (Lickel et al., 2006; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005; Simpson, Laham,
& Fiske, 2016). These studies found people capable of making “subtle
normative distinctions in relational schemas” when they evaluate
multiple scenarios (McGraw & Tetlock, 2005, p. 8), while they also
showed that evaluations of relational construal were similar to the
ones obtained from designs in which respondents only read one
scenario (Simpson et al., 2016).
After answering some questions related to demographics,
respondents were randomly assigned to the role of provider or user
to ensure that the findings were not specific to either users (who
access other consumers’ underutilized assets) or providers (who
offer those assets; Schor, 2014). They then read a short introductory
story specific to their role as a user or provider in the context of
online sharing of personal items (see Appendix A, text in bold and
italics). The objective was to provide respondents with sufficient
background information to help them imagine themselves as a
prospective participant of a peer‐to‐peer sharing platform, similar to
the experimental study by Raaijmakers, Vermeulen, Meeus, and
Zietsma (2015). This seems necessary because many Dutch people
were not yet familiar with the online sharing of personal items
(Duurzaam Ondernemen, 2016). For example, respondents allocated
to the user role read that they needed a standing table for a party
and that they had come across three alternatives to the more
traditional options of renting professionally or buying online, which
were described as too expensive.
Following the introductory story, all respondents read the
same three descriptions, each of a hypothetical sharing platform
with one of the three business models (see Appendix A for
the descriptions). The descriptions contained the two important
features of the three business models: the presence or absence
of a monetary payment from the user to the provider (“renting”
or “sharing for free”) and the nature of the social interactions
(“in‐person interaction” or “no in‐person interaction”). All
three options were based on the real life‐sharing platform
PeerbyClassic (a platform with a sharing for free model) and its
renting sibling PeerbyGo (Voor de Wereld van Morgen, n.d).
Building on the experimental work by Lamberton and Rose
(2012), the nonmonetary costs associated with the three
business models were included. For example, for users of a
sharing for a free platform, the transaction is free of charge,
however, the user is expected to personally pick up the item
from his or her neighbor, which costs time. The order in which
the three descriptions were presented was counterbalanced.
After reading the three descriptions, respondents were asked
to choose which sharing platform they preferred to access or
provide the sharing table.
Checks were included to capture the realism and credibility of the
hypothetical situation of being a user/provider of a standing table
and having to choose between the three platforms described. In line
with Sen and Bhattacharya (2001), respondents rated the hypothe-
tical situation on a 7‐point answer scale (1 = completely disagree;
7 = completely agree): “I found the situation in the above‐mentioned
scenario realistic” (realism) and “I had no problem imagining myself
in the above‐mentioned situation” (credibility). Respondents found
it easy to imagine the hypothetical situation: the mean scores of
realism was 5.30 and the mean score for credibility 5.25. Analysis
of variance (ANOVA) further revealed that ratings of realism and
credibility were not significantly different between the role of
provider and the role of the user (for realism: F(1,599) = 0.01, p = .93;
for credibility: F(1,599) = 1.08, p = .30).
3Appendix A and B present translations in English. The original material in Dutch is available
upon request.
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3.2 | Measures
We measured our dependent variable platform choice by asking
respondents to make a hypothetical choice‐decision between the
three sharing platforms.
To measure the perceptions of relationships among peers,
respondents read three short descriptions of the relational models
(these descriptions and the other measures can be found in
Appendix B). For example, the CS description was: “this is a
platform that is characterized by a high degree of generosity. On
this platform, people feel that they belong to the same group and
have a lot in common with one another.” Next, respondents were
asked to think about each of the three sharing platforms in turn
and to rate to what extent the descriptions matched how they
expected people to interact on this platform on a 7‐point Likert
scale (1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent). This approach is similar
to the one described in Biber, Hupfeld, and Meier (2008) and
Simpson et al. (2016) and allows to capture in a short amount of
time respondents’ perceptions of peer‐to‐peer relationships for
each of the business models.
Economic benefits were measured with three items adopted from
Hamari et al. (2016) and rated on a 7‐point Likert answer scale
(1 = completely disagree; 7 = completely agree). A representative
item is “I see myself participating in the sharing economy because it
will benefit me financially.” The scale was reliable (α = 0.73). Social
benefits were measured with four items adopted from Paul, Hennig‐
Thurau, Gremler, Gwinner, and Wiertz (2009) on a 7‐point Likert
scale (1 = completely disagree; 7 = completely agree). One of the
items is: “I see myself participating in the sharing economy because it
allows me to do something good for other members on the sharing
platform.” The scale was reliable (α = 0.83).
Several demographic factors were included as control variables,
namely gender, age, level of education, income, and geographic
location. Previous research has shown that low‐income groups
and older people are more motivated by economic benefits and
convenience (Böcker & Meelen, 2017), whilst women are more
socially driven (Hellwig et al., 2015). Studies also found the
willingness to participate to be lower in less densely populated areas
(Thebault‐Spieker, Terveen, & Hecht, 2015), indicating the need to
control for urban living as well.
In addition to these demographic variables and a dummy to
capture respondents’ role as provider or user, two individual‐level
characteristics were also included as controls. First, environmental
benefits were measured with a single item coming from Hamari
et al. (2016). Whilst we did not expect the three business models
to differ with regard to environmental benefits, we decided to
control for this type of benefits as it is often mentioned as a driver
of people’s participation in the sharing economy (e.g., Schor, 2014).
Second, given Hellwig et al.’s (2015) findings that participants can
be segmented based on generosity and generalized reciprocity, we
included a measure of other‐orientation using Schwartz’s (1994)
self‐transcendence as suggested by Schuler and Cording (2006).
Self‐transcendence corresponds to an other‐oriented view of
interactions and expresses “acceptance of others as equals and
concern for their welfare” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 25). Self‐transcen-
dence includes the values universalism (understanding, apprecia-
tion, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for
nature) and benevolence (preservation and enhancement of the
welfare of people with whom one is in frequent contact; Schwartz,
1994). Self‐transcendence was measured using the 10 portraits
from the portrait value questionnaire that measures universalism
and benevolence (Schwartz et al., 2001). Each short portrait
describes a person’s goals and aspirations and respondents have to
answer “how much like you is this person?” on a 6‐point Likert
scale (1 = not like me at all; 6 = very much like me). The reliability
of the scale was good (α = 0.80).
4 | RESULTS
This results section is structured in three steps: (a) the descriptive
statistics and correlations; (b) the results related the mental
perceptions of peer‐to‐peer relationships (H2a&b); and (c) the results
related to the drivers of consumers’ choice of one of the three peer‐
to‐peer sharing platform (H1a&b and H3a–c). Presenting together
the results for the effects of the type of benefits consumers seek
(H1a&b) and the differences in mental representations of peer‐to‐
peer relationships across the business models (H3a–c) make it
possible to show that the drivers suggested by relational models
theory complement what is already known in terms of the social and
economic benefits consumers seek.
4.1 | Descriptive statistics and correlations
As indicated in Table 1, the 601 respondents were divided relatively
equally across the “user” (48.4%) and “provider” scenarios (52.6%)
and across the 12 different versions (user/provider × six sequences
of the business models). Cross‐tabs analysis showed no significant
association between the order in which the platforms were
presented and respondents’ platform choice (χ2 = 8.94; p = .66).
4.2 | Business models and mental representations
of peer‐to‐peer relationships
Respondents were expected to rate the three hypothetical sharing
platforms differently on the three relational models. Specifically,
sharing for free was expected to score higher on CS compared to the
other two business models (H2a), renting with in‐person interactions
to score higher on EM than the other two business models (H2b) and
finally renting without in‐person interaction to score higher on MP
compared to the other two business models (H2c). These hypotheses
were tested with a series of separate one‐way repeated‐measures
ANOVAs with post hoc pairwise comparisons (Wendorf, 2004).
Whenever necessary we corrected the degrees of freedom with a
Greenhouse–Geisser correction (Abdi, 2010). Table 2 shows the
mean scores on CS, EM, and MP across the three business models.
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The results of the ANOVAs reported in Table 2 revealed that
these mean scores were significantly different across the three
business models: for CS (F(1.84, 1115.65) = 958.06; p < .001), on
EM (F(1.82, 1100.51) = 47.13; p < .001), and on MP (F(1.66,
1101.43) = 357.41; p < .001).
In support of H2a, a post hoc test revealed (see Table 3) that CS
perceptions were significantly higher for sharing for free (M = 5.977;
SD = 0.96) than for renting with in‐person interactions (M = 4.776;
SD = 1.06; p < .001) and for renting without in‐person interaction
condition (M = 3.40; SD = 1.25; p < .001). Results also supported H2b:
renting with in‐person interactions was scored higher on EM
(M = 5.34; SD = 1.02) than sharing for free (M = 4.92; SD = 1.30;
p < .001) and renting without in‐person interactions (M = 4.70;
SD = 1.26; p < .001). Finally, in line with H2c, pairwise comparisons
indicated that renting without in‐person interactions was scored
significantly higher on MP (M = 5.48; SD = 1.14) than sharing for free
(M = 3.57; SD = 1.52; p < .001) and renting with in‐person interactions
(M = 4.79; SD = 1.12; p < .001). The partial eta squared showed the
effect size of the type of business model on CS perceptions to be very
large (ηp
2 = 0.61), on EM perceptions to be medium (ηp
2 = 0.07), and
on MP perceptions to be large (ηp
2 = 0.37).
4.3 | Sought benefits, mental representations
of relationships, and choice
Exactly 50% of the respondents chose a sharing for free model and
29% chose renting with in‐person interactions, making renting
without in‐person interactions the least popular business model. To
test whether respondents’ choice was influenced by differences in
perceptions of peer‐to‐peer relationships across the business models
(H3a–c) as well as by the type of benefits they seek (H1a&b), the
choice variable was coded into three dummy variables—(a) sharing
for free versus renting without in‐person interactions; (b) renting
TABLE 3 Post hoc pairwise comparisons between the three business models
95% Confidence interval
Relational model Compare Mean difference Lower Upper
Communal sharing (CS) Sharing for free
vs. renting without in‐person interactions
2.57*** 2.41 2.73
Renting with in‐person interactions
vs. renting without in‐person interactions
1.36*** 1.22 1.49
Sharing for free
vs. renting with in‐person interactions
1.22*** 1.09 1.34
Equality matching (EM) Renting with in‐person interactions
vs. sharing for free
0.42*** 0.27 0.57
Renting with in‐person interactions
vs. renting without in‐person interactions
0.64*** 0.50 0.78
Sharing for free
vs. renting without in‐person interactions
0.22* 0.04 0.40
Market pricing (MP) Renting without in‐person interactions
vs. sharing for free
1.91*** 1.70 2.12
Renting without in‐person interactions
vs. renting with in‐person interactions
0.70*** 0.55 0.84
Renting with in‐person interactions
vs. sharing for free
1.21*** 1.05 1.38
Note: A Bonferroni correction has been applied.
**p< .01.
*p < .05.
***p < .001.
TABLE 2 Scores of the three business models on the three relational models
Sharing for free Renting with interactions Renting without interactions
Relational model M SD M SD M SD
F test for each
relational modela ηp2
Communal sharing (CS) 5.97 0.96 4.76 1.06 3.40 1.25 958.06*** 0.61
Equality matching (EM) 4.92 1.30 5.34 1.03 4.70 1.26 47.31*** 0.07
Market pricing (MP) 3.57 1.52 4.79 1.12 5.48 1.14 357.41*** 0.37
Abbreviation: SD, standard deviation.
aThe Greenhouse–Geiser adjustment is reported in all cases because the sphericity assumption was violated.
***p < .001.
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with in‐person interactions versus renting without in‐person inter-
actions; and (c) sharing for free versus renting with in‐person
interactions. Next, four binary logistic regressions were run for each
dummy variable (see Table 4): Model 1 containing only the control
variables, Model 2 containing the control variables and the CS, EM,
and MP differentials for the two business models that were
compared, Model 3 containing the control variables and the benefits
respondents sought, and Model 4 containing all the variables. Table 4
shows the odds ratio, that is, the change in odds resulting from a one‐
unit change in the predictor. An odds ratio >1 indicates that as the
predictor increases, the likelihood of the outcome occurring
increases. An odds ratio <1, on the other hand, indicates that as
the predictor increases, the odds of the outcome occurring decrease.
The χ2 values are shown in Table 4 under the model fit indicated that
Models 2, 3, and 4 containing the predictors of interest significantly
predicted respondents’ choice between each pair of business model.
In line with H1a—which predicted a positive relationship between
the search for social benefits and the likelihood of choosing sharing
for free over renting without in‐person interactions—inspection of
the odds ratios in Models 3 and 4 for this first pair of business models
showed that respondents in search of higher social benefits were
significantly more likely to prefer sharing for free (in Model 3:
Exp(B) = 2.05; p < .001; in Model 4: Exp(B) = 2.07; p < .001). The
magnitude of the odds ratios (2.05 and 2.04) further revealed that
one unit increase on the 7‐point scale for social benefits was linked to
doubling the likelihood of choosing sharing for free over renting
without in‐person interactions.
Similarly, H1b—which predicted a positive relationship between
the search for economic benefits and the likelihood of choosing
renting without in‐person interactions over sharing for free—was
supported. The odd ratios in Models 3 and 4 for the first pair of
business models in Table 4 indicate that respondents in search of
higher economic benefits were significantly less likely to prefer
sharing for free (in Model 3: Exp(B) = 0.61; p < .001; in Model 4: Exp
(B) = 0.61; p = .001), and, therefore, more likely to prefer renting
without in‐person interactions.
TABLE 4 Logistic regressions to test the relationships between perceptions of peer‐to‐peer relationships and choice
Predictors
Sharing for free vs. renting without
in‐person interactions
Renting with in‐person interactions vs.
renting without in‐person interactions
Sharing for free vs. renting with
in‐person interactions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
CS differentials 1.25** 1.31** 1.32** 1.32** 1.33*** 1.37***
EM differentials 1.20** 1.18* 1.15 1.16 1.10 1.09
MP differentials 1.10 1.10 1.03 1.02 1.09 1.07
Social benefits 2.05*** 2.07*** 1.37* 1.37* 1.49*** 1.50***
Economic benefits 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.84 0.85 0.67*** 0.66***
Controls:
Environmental
benefits
1.10 1.10 0.90 0.90 1.12 1.12 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.02 0.90 0.91
Other‐orientation 2.37** 2.39** 1.87* 1.93* 1.75† 1.74† 1.71† 1.70† 1.43 1.48 1.28 1.33
Provider 0.93 0.93 0.74 0.75 1.21 1.16 1.12 1.07 0.76 0.72 0.68† 0.63*
Age 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.02* 1.02† 1.01 1.01
Female 1.05 1.11 0.91 0.99 0.78 0.90 0.76 0.88 1.34 1.29 1.34 1.29
Education lowera 0.84 0.88 0.69 0.77 0.54 0.59 0.53 0.57 1.50 1.51 1.18 1.20
Education higher
vocationala
0.81 0.84 0.93 1.00 1.08 1.16 1.039 1.13 0.82 0.86 0.75 0.79
Income mediumb 0.76 0.69 0.67 0.61 0.47* 0.46* 0.46* 0.44* 1.47 1.38 1.31 1.25
Income highb 1.31 1.14 1.09 0.96 0.73 0.65 0.70 0.62 1.61 1.52 1.38 1.30
Urban living 0.83 0.90 0.91 1.00 0.94 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 1.09 1.07
Model fit:
Model χ2 32.72*** 51.54*** 87.92*** 104.89*** 15.87 31.38* 23.60* 38.64*** 32.66*** 46.83*** 59.04*** 77.49***
Cox and Snell R2 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.22 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.15
Nagelkerke R2 0.11 0.16 0.26 0.31 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.21
Correct classification:
Overall (%) 71.4 71.0 73.5 75.6 61.8 63.5 66.1 66.8 62.4 65.8 69.0 68.4
Choice (%) 96.7 91.7 90.0 89.3 82.8 79.3 83.9 79.9 87.3 86.7 86.0 83.3
Nonchoice (%) 11.8 22.0 34.6 43.3 33.1 41.7 41.7 48.8 19.5 29.9 39.7 42.5
aThe baseline is a university degree.
bThe baseline is a low income. The reported coefficients are the odds ratios (Exp(B)).
†p < .1.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001 (two‐tailed).
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While no hypothesis was formulated regarding the relationships
between benefits and the other two binary choices between models, the
odd ratios revealed that, similarly to what was observed for the choice
between sharing for free and renting without in‐person interactions, the
likelihood of choosing sharing for free over renting with in‐person
interactions was significantly positively related with seeking social
benefits (in Model 3: Exp(B) = 1.49; p< .001; in Model 4: Exp(B) = 1.50;
p< .001) and significantly negatively related with seeking economic
benefits (in Model 3: Exp(B) = 0.67; p= .001; in Model 4: Exp(B) = 0.66;
p= .001). In contrast, the results showed that only social benefits were
significantly related with the choice between renting with in‐person
interactions and renting without in‐person interactions: the odd ratios
indicated that the more respondents were driven by social benefits, the
more likely they were to prefer renting with in‐person interactions over
renting without such interactions (in Model 3: Exp(B) = 1.37; p= .01; in
Model 4: Exp(B) = 1.37; p= .013). There was no significant relationship
between economic benefits and the choice between the two renting
models (in Model 3: Exp(B) = 0.84; p= .28; in Model 4: Exp(B) = 0.85;
p= .30).
Turning to the mental representations of peer‐to‐peer relationships,
the results provided support for H3a, which predicted that larger
differences in CS scores would increase the likelihood of choosing the
business model with the higher score, which, as expected, turned out to
be sharing for free. This held for the choice between sharing for free and
renting without in‐person interactions (in Model 2: Exp(B) = 1.25;
p= .006; in Model 4: Exp(B) = 1.31; p= .002), for the choice between
renting with in‐person interactions and renting without in‐person
interactions (in Model 2: Exp(B) = 1.32; p= .002; in Model 4: Exp
(B) = 1.32; p= .003), as well as for the choice between sharing for free
and renting with in‐person interactions (in Model 2: Exp(B) = 1.33;
p= .001; in Model 4: Exp(B) = 1.37; p< .001). Looking across all these odd
ratios, a one‐unit increase in the difference in CS score is linked to an
increase of about 30% of the likelihood of choosing sharing for free over
renting without in‐person interactions.
H3b, which proposed a positive relationship between larger
differences in EM scores and likelihood of choosing the model with the
higher score was only supported for the choice between sharing for free
and renting without in‐person interactions (in Model 2: Exp(B) = 1.20;
p= .006; in Model 4: Exp(B) = 1.18; p= .02). In contrast, to what was
hypothesized in H3b, larger differences in EM scores between business
models did not relate significantly to the likelihood of choosing renting
with in‐person interactions over renting without in‐person interactions (in
Model 2: Exp(B) = 1.15; p= .11 in Model 4: Exp(B) = 1.16; p= .11) or
sharing for free over renting with in‐person interactions (in Model 2: Exp
(B) = 1.10; p=0.19; in Model 4: Exp(B) = 1.09; p= .23).
Finally, H3c, which proposed a negative relationship between
larger differences in MP scores and the likelihood of choosing the
business model with the largest score, was not supported for any of
the three choices. Odds ratios were neither significant for the choice
between sharing for free and renting without in‐person interactions
(in Model 2: Exp(B) = 1.10; p = .12; in Model 4: Exp(B) = 1.10; p = .16),
nor for the choice between renting with and renting without in‐
person interactions (in Model 2: Exp(B) = 1.03; p = .79; in Model 4:
Exp(B) = 1.02; p = .86), nor for the choice between sharing for free
and renting with in‐person interactions (in Model 2: Exp(B) = 1.09;
p = .21; in Model 4: Exp(B) = 1.07; p = .33).
While the hypotheses regard either the effects of the type of
benefits consumers seek on consumers’ choice of a platform
(H1a&b) or the effects of the differences in mental representations
of peer‐to‐peer relationships across the business models (H3a–c),
comparing the results reported in Models 2 and 3 to the results
reported in Model 4 provides additional information about how
these two sets of explanations relate to each other. Specifically,
the coefficients and significance levels remain very similar when
entering the two sets of explanatory variables together in Model 4
as compared to having them separately in Models 2 and 3 (with
only the differentials in perceptions of the relational models in
Model 2 and only the two types of benefits in Model 3). This
indicates that the effects of these explanatory variables on
consumers’ choice do not overlap much, but rather complement
each other in explaining this dependent variable.
The results for the control variables in Table 4 suggests that
consumers’ other‐orientation helps explain consumers’ choice of sharing
for free over renting without in‐person interactions even when all our
variables of interest are taken into consideration (in Model 4: Exp
(B) = 1.93; p= .04). Similar results are observed for consumers’ choice of
renting with in‐person interactions over renting without in‐person
interactions, but these results are only significant at the 10% level (in
Model 4: Exp(B) = 1.70; p= .09). In contrast, consumers’ other‐orientation
does not help explain the choice of sharing for free over renting with in‐
person interactions. As expected, the environmental benefits consumers
seek do not relate to consumers’ choice among the three business models
studied here. This was expected because the three business models do
not differ along this dimension. Finally, we did not find much evidence for
a difference between users and providers. The only difference between
users and providers significant at the 5% level was found for the choice
between sharing for free and renting with in‐person interactions:
providers are more likely than users to choose renting with in‐person
interactions over sharing for free (in Model 4: Exp(B) = 0.63; p= .03).
5 | DISCUSSION
At a time where peer‐to‐peer sharing platforms are experiment-
ing with various business models to find a way to both attract
enough consumers and earn money from their activities, the
present study aimed to shed new light on consumers’ choice
among three platform business models by turning to what
consumers expect platforms to deliver with regard to the nature
of relationships among consumers, in complement to the usual
focus on the types of benefits (social and economic) consumers
seek. Using a within‐subject, joint evaluation design whereby
respondents reported a hypothetical choice among three plat-
forms that differ only with regard to their business model, the
results revealed three things.
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First, in line with previous research arguing that individuals
look for social benefits in addition to economic benefits when they
engage in the sharing economy (Bucher et al., 2016; Habibi et al.,
2016; Hamari et al., 2016; Hellwig et al., 2015), sharing for free
was found to be the most popular business model, followed by
renting with in‐person interactions, whereas only one in five
respondents chose renting without in‐person interactions over
the other two alternatives. A basic message is, therefore, that
there is room for a variety of business models across peer‐to‐peer
sharing platforms.
Second, the study lends support for Hellwig et al.’s (2015)
proposition that individuals would be more attracted to some
platforms than others according to the type of benefits they seek.
As expected based on the literature, comparing sharing for free
and renting without in‐person interactions showed that seeking
social benefits increased the likelihood to choose a sharing for the
free model while seeking economic benefits increased the
likelihood of choosing renting without in‐person interactions.
For researchers interested in the impact of social and economic
benefits on platform attractiveness, the novelty of this study
was to consider two different business models in which sharing
is monetized, namely renting with and without in‐person interac-
tions. This allows for a more fine‐grained understanding of the
impact of monetizing sharing. Comparing sharing for free and
renting with in‐person interactions revealed the same pattern as
for the choice between sharing for free and renting without in‐
person interactions: seeking social (economic) benefits makes
choosing sharing for free (renting with in‐person interactions)
more likely. Comparing renting with and without in‐person
interactions showed that consumers were more likely to choose
the former when seeking social benefits, but were not pulled
toward the later in search of economic benefits.
Third, based on relational models theory, the results show that
the business model of sharing platforms influences how consumers
see peer‐to‐peer relationships on the platform. More precisely, the
scores of the three business models on the relational models suggest
that changing platforms’ business models toward renting and more
convenience by removing in‐person interactions is likely to result in
making peer‐to‐peer sharing appear more like traditional economic
exchanges (MP). These scores also reveal that renting with in‐person
interactions was perceived as falling in between the two other
business models in terms of CS and MP, but was perceived as
highest on EM.
Finally, the paper also found that some of the mental representa-
tions of peer‐to‐peer relationships help explain consumers’ choice of
sharing platform. Specifically, the results showed that consumers’
choice was linked to the degree to which peer‐to‐peer relationships
were perceived as governed by CS. Differences in CS perceptions
explained the choice of sharing for free over both renting with and
without in‐person interactions, as well as the choice of renting with
over renting without in‐person interactions. In contrast to what was
hypothesized, differences in EM perceptions explained relatively
little: the differences in EM perceptions were only significant for the
choice of sharing for free over renting without in‐person interactions.
This could be linked to the fact that, while significant, the differences
between the three business models on the EM dimension were quite
smaller than the differences in the CS dimension (see Table 3).
Surprisingly too, the differences in MP perceptions were not
significantly related to platform choice, even though the scores on
MP varied significantly across the business models.
The last section below summarizes the contributions, presents
the contributions, discusses the managerial limitations, and offers
directions for future research.
6 | CONCLUSION
6.1 | Contributions
The present research adds to the body of research examining
platform attractiveness by making three contributions. A first
important contribution of the study is to use relational models
theory to provide a complementary explanation to the traditional
focus on the type of benefits consumers seek. How consumers see
the relationships among participants on peer‐to‐peer sharing plat-
forms was found to explain their choice of the platform above and
beyond the type of benefits they seek. While complementary in their
explanatory power, these explanations are also related to each other,
therefore, the title “the other side of the coin”. In this respect, the
application of relational models theory points to the need to more
systematically unpack the nature of the social benefits consumers
seek and peer‐to‐peer sharing platforms can deliver. Specifically,
sharing through a peer‐to‐peer sharing platform can provide at least
two forms of social benefits: benefits that come from belonging to a
community where altruism guides transactions (CS) and benefits that
come from transacting with partners who are seen as equal on the
basis of balanced reciprocity (EM). The sharing literature has so far
focused on the former form of social benefits by emphasizing the
emotional bonds with others, the belonging to a community, and the
possibility to do something good for others (Hellwig et al., 2015).
While Belk (2010) typified altruism as generalized reciprocity, which
may be somewhat confusing, altruism, and balanced reciprocity, and,
therefore, the social benefits they can provide to consumers, are
fundamentally different from each other. Where altruism implies
solidarity with members of the same community rather than an
obligation to reciprocate (Celata, Hendrickson, & Sanna, 2017),
balanced reciprocity is very much about the obligation to reciprocate.
According to relational models theory, one may experience the
obligation to reciprocate without identifying strongly with a
community, as long as one does not purely identify at the individual
level and sees the exchange partner as a means to a personal end.
A second contribution of the study is to suggest that it is not so
much making peer‐to‐peer sharing more market‐like that affects
platform attractiveness but making it more community‐like. Some
authors have questioned how monetizing sharing transactions would
affect the attractiveness of the sharing economy on the arguments,
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among others, that renting is not true sharing (Belk, 2014a) and that
an emphasis on economic benefits would alienate consumers seeking
social benefits (Hellwig et al., 2015). Others are more hopeful,
arguing that it is feasible to have “dual‐mode” business models that
combine social and economic benefits in consumers’ eyes (Habibi
et al., 2017). The results here indicate that money does not seem to
necessarily “profane the sharing transaction and transform it into a
commodity exchange” as Belk (2014, p. 19) expected it. Specifically,
while consumers scored the three business models differently on MP
(with renting without in‐person interactions scoring highest and
sharing for free lowest), these differences did not contribute to
explaining consumers’ choice among the models. Rather it may be
that MP is the default model for relationships among strangers and
that peer‐to‐peer sharing can offer more than this default when peer‐
to‐peer relationships are perceived to be also governed by CS and, to
a smaller extent, by EM.
Finally, by comparing three business models that differ along the
two dimensions free versus renting and with or without in‐person
interactions, the study contributes some new insights into what
drives the capacity of platforms to deliver social benefits. Whereas
the literature has long focused on the free versus monetized sharing
as the key dimension for the delivery of more or less social benefits
to consumers (Belk, 2010, 2014a; Habibi et al., 2017; Hellwig et al.,
2015), work has also pointed at the importance of in‐person
interactions (Pera et al., 2019; Rosen et al., 2011). The present
study suggests that both dimensions matter. On the one hand, in
support of an impact of the (non)monetization of sharing on social
benefits, higher perceptions of CS and seeking social benefits were
found to explain the choice of sharing for free over renting with in‐
person interactions. On the other hand, in‐person interactions also
appear to matter in delivering social benefits: higher perceptions of
CS and seeking social benefits were also found to explain the choice
of renting with in‐person interactions over renting without in‐person
interactions.
6.2 | Managerial implications
This work has two clear implications for platform managers. First, for
platform managers who wish to replace sharing for free by a renting
scheme, this study shows that, for a large majority of consumers, it is
important to keep in‐person interactions rather than introducing
remote access technologies with the hope that consumers will be
swayed by an increase in convenience. The success of Airbnb
illustrates just how much value renting with in‐person interactions
can generate if implemented properly.
Second, that renting does not necessarily destroy the social
benefits a platform can deliver to consumers is good news for
managers of sharing platforms who are looking for ways to capture
some of the value their platform generates without endangering the
attractiveness of their platform. To managers who wish to preserve
social benefits while introducing a renting scheme in their business
model, the present study suggests working toward activating a CS
frame in consumers. Examples of successful sharing platforms
indicate that activating a CS frame in consumers can be achieved
in a number of ways. A first way to do this is to embed the idea of
community in the mission of the platform. Airbnb, for example, claims
to exist “to create a world where anyone can belong anywhere,
providing healthy travel that is local, authentic, diverse, inclusive, and
sustainable”.4
A second way is to organize local offline events such as meet and
greets between members, workshops around common themes, or a
neighborhood get‐together to foster a sense of emotional bounding
and community. For example, Couchsurfing’s members in the same
geographic area, along with nearby Couchsurfing’s travelers, often
hold physical community gatherings and participate in activities
(Rosen et al., 2011). By offering or supporting offline community‐
building events, peer‐to‐peer sharing platforms can actually trans-
form themselves into hybrid online‐offline communities (Rosen et al.,
2011).
Third, while our research focused on how the “free versus
renting” and “with or without in‐person interactions” dimensions of
business models affect consumers’ perceptions of peers in general,
platforms can enable consumers to build personal reputations.
Personal reputation mechanisms, in turn, make it possible to perceive
CS relationships with specific peers, even if at the level of the
platform peer‐to‐peer relationships are not seen as governed much
by CS. In line with this argument, research has shown that personal
reputation outweighs product descriptions in explaining providers’
popularity (Mauri, Minazzi, Nieto‐García, & Viglia, 2018). To support
consumers’ building personal reputations, it seems important that
platforms implement rating systems and encourage the sharing of
personal information such as full identification and personal photo
(Abrate & Viglia, 2019; Wang & Nicolau, 2017).
6.3 | Limitations and future research
With its use of hypothetical scenarios and joint evaluation design,
this study presents several limitations. First, respondents were asked
to imagine themselves being in possession of or looking for a
personal item, namely a standing table. More research is needed to
investigate whether the findings described above generalize to other
personal items. On the one hand, motivations to participate in
different subsectors of peer‐to‐peer sharing seem to differ: the
correlational study by Böcker and Meelen (2017) indicated that
economic motivations matter more for accommodations and car‐
sharing than they do for sharing a meal or a ride. On the other hand,
one could expect that the much larger financial and emotional risks
involved in sharing prized possessions such as homes and cars could
make perceptions of relationships matter much more than for the
sharing of a standing table. Second, whereas a joint evaluation design
has the advantage of more reasoned choices, consumers do not
always have full information regarding alternative business models in
practice. As research has shown that participants sometimes make
4https://press.airbnb.com/about‐us/.
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different choices when they receive information about just one
option (separate evaluation) versus when they can easily compare all
the options (joint evaluation; e.g., Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, &
Bazerman, 1999), future research should replicate our study with a
between‐group experimental design where respondents only have
information about one business model. Third, while the respondents
reported high scores for realism and credibility, the use of
hypothetical scenarios may have biased the results. To check the
external validity of our results, future research should also study the
attractiveness of actual platforms amongst individuals who are
considering joining a peer‐to‐peer sharing platform.
In this study, we found that different business models are linked
to different perceptions of relationships among peers, which, in turn,
influence consumers’ choice among peer‐to‐peer sharing platforms.
Future work might investigate whether how consumers frame their
relationships with other members of a sharing platform also helps
answer other questions that are important to predict the future of
the sharing economy. In particular, there is a lot of potential in
applying relational models theory to research how sharing platforms
can build trust among peers and facilitate active participation, two
topics researchers have called to study more (e.g., Möhlmann, 2015,
2016, Tussyadiah, 2015). Future research could also investigate the
impact of different business models on consumers’ behavior, in
particular, the care they take of other people’s personal items. While
in relationships governed by EM and CS the norms guiding behaviors
compel consumers to take into consideration the well‐being of
others, pursuing one’s self‐interest is normatively appropriate in MP
relationships (Fiske, 1991). As mentioned at the beginning of the
paper, Turo, a US‐based peer‐to‐peer car‐sharing platform (formerly
known as RelayRides) has experienced the dangers of removing in‐
person interactions when it installed General Motors’ OnStar system,
a tool that allows people to unlock cars via an app. Removing in‐
person interactions led to a dramatic increase in self‐interested
behavior and in disputes among members (RelayRides, 2013; Van de
Glind, 2015). As a result, the platform reverted back to its old system
with in‐person interactions in 2013. According to Turo’s CEO Andre
Haddad: “connecting people is the platform’s “secret sauce.” It helps
people feel they can trust each other more” (Loizos, 2015).
Moreover, whilst this study focused on two common dimensions
of business models—namely, sharing for free or a fee and the
presence or absence of in‐person interactions—future research might
study other dimensions that could also affect how consumers frame
peer‐to‐peer relationships, among which open versus closed access
to assets and the availability of online tools that promote peer‐to‐
peer interactions. With regard to the nature of access to assets, there
are new business models where access to a particular asset is by
invitation only (closed access). For example, “our car” by Leaseplan
allows to only share one’s car with friends and neighbors. Closed
access should help the framing of relationships in CS terms (Lickel
et al., 2006). CS is more likely to be primed by perceptions of a “moral
circle” in which a clear distinction is made between in and out‐group
members (Rai and Fiske, 2012). Second, platforms can also strive to
develop and maintain social interactions through mobile phone apps
that allow for direct communication, email services, and text message
notifications. Participants are indeed more likely to rate a group as
high on CS when they describe group interactions as frequent (Lickel
et al., 2006; Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2001).
More generally, as they think about the relevant features of
business models for peer‐to‐peer sharing platforms, scholars could
build on what is known about the design principles for groups that
face a tension between individual and collective interests (Ostrom,
1990). Clear boundaries and monitoring systems are two of these
design principles, but other principles are also important in
supporting prosocial behavior such as the presence of graduated
sanctions (from light punishment for first‐time offenders to severe
punishment for repeated offenders) and conflict resolution mechan-
isms that help to resolve conflicts quickly and in ways that are
perceived as fair by peers (Wilson, Ostrom, & Cox, 2013).
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APPENDIX B
See Table B1.
TABLE B1 Scale items for Study 1
Scale Statements Source
Relational models “Please indicate to what extent the interactions amongst people match the following
three descriptions”
Communal sharing Description 1
… This is a platform that is characterized by a high degree of generosity. On this
platform, people feel that they belong to the same group and have a lot in common
with one another.
Biber et al. (2008); Haslam
and Fiske (1999)
Equality matching Description 2
… This is a platform that is characterized by equality and reciprocity. On this platform
people try to maintain a healthy balance between what they contribute and get out of
the relationship.
Market pricing Description 3
… People on this platform believe that they are entitled to a good return on what they
contribute to the platform. A bit like a business relationship.
“I see myself participating in the sharing economy because….”
Functional benefits … it will save me money Hamari et al. (2016)
… it will benefit me financially.
… it will improve my economic situation.
… it will save me time.
Social benefits … it creates a feeling of attachment with other members on the platform. Paul et al. (2009)
… it allows me to do something good for other members on the platform.
… it allows me to have enjoyable interactions with other members on the platform.
… it helps to ensure that I live in a thriving local community.
Environmental benefits … it is a sustainable mode of consumption Hamari et al. (2016)
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